The devastating conflict in Yemen enters its fourth year with no end in sight. In 2017, this conflict cast a dark shadow over the humanitarian situation of the country, which was classified as the poorest country in the region even before the crisis.
Yemen, which was once known as ‘Arabia Felix’, is now going through its most miserable times. It is torn apart between the local, regional and international parties to the conflict, whose practices are marked with recklessness and bullying. Those parties’ practices have produced the worst humanitarian disaster crushing millions of Yemenis alongside an overall volatile region, and an international scene where the interests of regimes and governments prevail over values of justice and human rights.
From 2011 till now, Yemen has undergone drastic changes, which have changed the map of the players in the political scene. These changes have affected the political players’ tools, priorities, alliances, rhetoric and mechanisms of action. Political dynamics have given way to military action; and the military has taken different sides among the parties to the conflict. The armed group of Ansar Allah (the Houthis) overtook the capital city of Sana’a on September 21st, 2014 while expanding to other parts of the country. Four months later, they placed President Abdurbo Mansour Hadi, the Prime Minister Khalid Mahfouz Bahah and most of the ministers; to house arrests on January 20th, 2015
After nearly a month of being placed under house arrest in Sana’a, President Hadi fled to Aden on February 21, 2015. By then Ansar Allah (the Houthis) group took control of most of the Northern governorates and were preparing fighters to head South towards Aden, which President Hadi announced as a “temporary capital”, especially after the departure of embassies and diplomatic missions from the capital city of Sana’a.
Ansar Allah (the Houthi) group, allied with the armed forces loyal to the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, were able to take control of the city of Aden. This coincided with the intensification of tension in the governorate of Taiz, located on the road to Aden from the North. Fighting continued on the outskirts of two Southern governorates: Shabwah and Abyan. President Hadi managed to escape to the Saudi capital of Riyadh on March 25th, 2015.
Hours after President Hadi fled to Riyadh, warplanes of the Saudi-led Coalition of nine Arab countries, launched heavy raids against the Ansar Allah (the Houthi) group and pro-Saleh forces. The dawn of Thursday, March 26, 2015 marked the beginning of a war that has extended to all the Yemeni governorates and has not stopped until now.
Humanitarian reports indicate that Yemen is witnessing what could be the world worst humanitarian crisis, in addition to human rights abuses that are in violation of the humanitarian international law and international human rights law; and which have been committed against civilians by all parties to the conflict. With a deteriorating health system[1], and blockade on food and medical assistance, the country has witnessed the worst Cholera outbreak and some other epidemic diseases like diphtheria.
In a statement on January 11th, 2018, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, Jamie McGoldrick said, “the lives of Yemenis, of whom more than 22 million are in need of humanitarian assistance, depend on keeping the ports open without interruptions or delays. I therefore urge all parties to the conflict to refrain from any disruptive action which may lead to further suffering of the Yemeni people.”[2]
Since August 2016, Yemenis have lived under severe conditions, especially after the stoppage of salaries by the main authorities in Sana’a and Aden. The situation has been made worse by the frequent shortages of fuel, its high prices as well as the unprecedented high exchange rates of US dollar [3] which led to the increase of food prices to more than double. Sana’a airport remains closed for commercial flights and Hodeidah seaport is not fully nor regularly operational. This has negatively affected the humanitarian situation in Yemen.[4]
One of the reasons for this catastrophic humanitarian crisis is the stagnation that prevailed over the political file where no progress was made at all. Ismael Ould Cheikh Ahmad, the former UN Special Envoy to Yemen, has made many visits to the states of the region, the capitals of influential countries, and Yemen. He has met the parties to the conflict in Sana’a and Aden, but his efforts had not yielded any solutions to the crisis.
On May 22nd, 2017, a group of protesters intercepted the convoy of Ould Cheikh after arriving at Sana’a International Airport[5], and shot at his motorcade while en route to the mission’s residence. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) denied any connection to this but ended up refusing to meet with him, requesting his departure and finally preventing him from visiting Sana’a. This forced Ould Cheikh to delegate his deputy Mr. Maeen Shuraim, to meet the representatives of Ansar Allah to the negotiations[6].
On October 10th, 2017, during his briefing in the Security Council, Ould Cheikh announced a humanitarian initiative as part of a comprehensive proposal to return to the negotiation table. Given the details of this initiative[7], the conflicting parties did not take a single step towards its implementation. Ould Cheikh’s efforts in Yemen ended and he resigned from his mission at the end of January 2018[8]. The British national, Martin Griffith was appointed as his successor.
In 2017, the political scene in Yemen underwent changes that led to complicating the crisis even further. On Monday, December 4th, 2017, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (President for 33 years) was killed in the fierce clashes that broke out in the capital city of Sana’a and lasted for almost a week. The clashes broke out between the pro-Saleh forces and Ansar Allah militants following the collapse of the otherwise fragile alliance between the two parties that lasted for nearly three years. The bloody fighting ended with the full takeover of Sana’a by Ansar Allah (Houthis).
A few months earlier, the relations of the two allied parties suffered a strain that manifested itself in the form of media campaigns and security-related incidents, including the armed clashes that broke out in August 2017 between a convoy belonging to one of Saleh’s son, and a Houthi-run security checkpoint in the Misbahi Roundabout downtown Sana’a[9]. Khaled Al-Radhi, a senior officer close to Saleh, and three members of the Houthi-run security checkpoint were killed in these clashes.
Although the alliance between former president, Saleh and Ansar Allah has actually come to an end, the latter made sure to retain the formal authority of the Supreme Political Council (a council formed by both parties in July 2016) and the coalition government that sprang out of it.
In the Southern parts of the country, the political, security and humanitarian situation remains tense in spite of the defeat of the Houthi-Saleh forces in most of the Southern governorates in July 2015 These governorates came under the authority of President Hadi and his government currently residing in Riyadh. However, UAE-backed parties strengthened their grip over the city of Aden, which is used by the internationally recognized government of President Hadi, as the temporary capital of the country. These parties also tightened their grip on other cities in the South. Sharp differences emerged between the UAE and President Hadi, following decisions taken by the latter, which aimed at reducing the UAE influence.
On April 27th, 2017, President Hadi relieved Adiros Zubaidi of his post as governor of Aden and appointed businessman Abdul Aziz Al-Muflihi in office. Hadi also relieved the Salafi cleric Hani Bin Buraik from his post as commander of the UAE-backed Security Belt. The decision included referring Hani Bin Buraik for investigation[10]. These resolutions led to demonstrations by supporters of the parties to support or condemn them.
Al-Muflihi failed to carry out his duties as governor, and was also banned from entering the headquarters of the governorate. He eventually left for Egypt, and announced his resignation[11] from there. Three other governors were dismissed by Hadi in late June 2017: the governor of Hadramout, Ahmed Bin Buraik; the governor of Shabwah, Ahmed Hamid Al-Amlas; and the governor of Socotra, Salem Al-Sokotri; a movement that was closely linked to the reports of the UAE influence[12].
With Emirati support, the parties affected by Hadi’s decisions sought to organize themselves. In less than a month since the dismissal of Al-Zubaidi and Hani Bin Buraik, the so-called Southern Transitional Council was announced on May 11, 2017. The dismissed Aden governor, Adiros Al-Zubaidi was declared to be the head of the new council.
These developments have led to a state of tension between two active forces on the ground in Aden: the “Security Belt” forces, which is a splinter well-armed group of the pro-Hadi forces on the one hand and on the other hand the Hadi-backed Presidential Guards forces, which appear to lack control and popular support. As the relations between Hadi and the Arab Coalition cooled down, the Transitional Council declared the so-called “Popular Uprising” late January 2018. The so-called “Popular Uprising” was followed by military encounters between the Aden Security Belt forces and the Presidential Guards forces. The fighting lasted for three days and claimed the lives of a number of innocent civilians[13]. The ICRC Head of mission to Aden, Carlos Batallas, stated that 36 people were killed and 185 others wounded in the Aden clashes[14]. The clashes ended with almost a full takeover of several Southern governorates, especially Aden and Dhalae by the “Southern Transitional Council”[15].
The Arab Coalition is to blame for eroding Hadi’s authority and for preventing him from returning to the city of Aden to carry out his duties. There has also been much debate about the fact that he was placed under house arrest in the Saudi capital Riyadh or not.
In terms of the Arab coalition military operations, many fighting fronts remained the same, with the exception of some advances of UAE-backed forces on the West Coast as well as Shabwah and Al-Bayda governorates in the eastern part of the country. On February 10, 2017, government forces backed by the Arab Coalition announced their capture of the strategic port of Mocha to the West of Taiz[16].
In the governorate of Shabwah, forces of the “26” infantry brigade, with the participation of the Shabwani Elite forces, managed to take over the districts of Bayhan and Asylan. These two districts were the last two strongholds of Ansar Allah group in the governorate, and the clashes extended to include parts of the district of Nata’a in the governorate of Al-Bayda[17].
Although the military scene maintains its bloody rivalry between two parties, the Arab Coalition and the pro-Hadi forces on the one hand, and the Houthis and their military allies on the other, deep differences have begun to emerge with the protracted crisis.
The Arab Coalition, as it became clear in 2017, would provide its support for forces that are not actually loyal to the pro-Hadi government. Such forces seem sometimes like splinter groups that take orders from UAE forces or its local proxies, including: the Security Belt forces, Shabwani Elite forces and the Hadrami Elite forces. There are military brigades with marginal support under President Hadi’s authority such as the presidential Guards forces stationed in Aden and other forces in Abyan, Taiz and Mareb, as well as the so-called “popular resistance”, which is popular militias formed since the beginning of the war.
After the death of Saleh by the end of 2017, the Ansar Allah forces became known as unilateral forces. Even though pro-Saleh military personnel take part in the fighting, it is Ansar Allah (the Houthis) now that run the the military operations. In its media outlets though, the group continues to speak of the “Popular Committees”, the original name of its militias since it took over the capital Sana’a by force on September 21, 2014.
With regard to the freedom of movement, Ansar Allah continues to impose a partial siege on the city of Taiz which forces people to travel through dangerous and rugged secondary roads. People spend a lot of money, effort and time (about 3-4 hours to get to the city from the suburbs and back) to exercise their right to movement to and from Taiz.
Due to the closure of the Sana’a International Airport since August 2016, Yemeni people are left with only Aden and Seiyun air ports to fly out of the country. Yemenis are forced to take a road trip, at first, by bus to Seiyun (almost 22 hours away from Sana’a), or to Aden (almost 9 hours away from Sana’a). Some of them might find themselves compelled to take a road trip to the Sultanate of Oman to the east of Yemen, in a journey that takes more than 24 hours, in order to take a flight from Salalah International Airport. This trip is very tiring especially for those who require medical attention. Passengers face the risk of being potential victims, of arbitrary detention in many checkpoints run by both parties to the conflict.
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On the way from the Capital city of Sana’a to Seiyun in Hadramout, public buses take a detour to Al-Bayda governorate to avoid entering into the military closed area of Nihm. In Al-Bayda, passengers are subjected to thorough inspection especially in the Houthi-run Abu Hashim checkpoint in Al-Bayda. They are nonetheless subjected to the same thorough inspection in Bab al-Falaj checkpoint which is run by pro-Hadi forces at the entrance of Mareb governorate. A number of travelers may be arbitrarily detained for reasons related to their family names[18], for doubts about their connections with one party to the conflict or for being members of the opposition.
In the southern parts of the country, in late 2017, so-called Security Belt forces did not allow some travelers to enter into the city because their IDs were not issued from the southern governorates (i.e. they don’t come from southern governorates). Those passengers were ordered to get off the buses and wait by the roadside[19]. Since the expulsion of Ansar Allah-Saleh forces from Aden and some southern areas in 2015, these forces allow those who do not have identification documents issued from the southern governorates to enter the city of Aden only when they have a passport and a plane ticket from Aden International Airport.
Constraints on movement continue to be imposed on Yemeni people including entry into Arab and foreign countries as the armed conflict continues and the lack of a political solution in sight.
At the beginning of 2017, Donald Trump, the US president, signed an executive order banning citizens of six countries, including Yemen, from entering into the US.[20]
The war has created a fertile environment for radical jihadist groups, with operations targeting security and military personnel, Islamic Imams, opinion leaders and government headquarters in the governorates of Aden, Shabwah and Hadramout. Some of these operations have been organized by the so-called ISIS.